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In the last decades, the role of International Informal Networks of Market Regulators (IINMR's) has experienced a substantial growth.
The rules governing the world's financial markets can frequently be traced to the meetings of these networks rather than to national government institutions such as cabinets, parliaments or courts.
Whereas it is true that IINMR's provide a lot of technical expertise in the rulemaking procedures, it is nevertheless clear that they often regulate outside of the traditional channels of democratic oversight and accountability.
This project analyzes the democratic deficits of three IINMR's operating in the fields of banking, securities and insurance (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS), on the basis of certain quantitative and qualitative indicators, as well as the responses that three jurisdictions (Spain, the UK, the US) provide in terms of parliamentary control over the IINMR's and their members.
The purpose of the project is, firstly, to understand why IINMR's democratic deficits justify parliamentary intervention and, secondly, to analyze the differences in parliamentary control over the networks in different jurisdictions as well as the relations between the instruments of oversight and different constitutional models of government. On the basis of these results, some policy proposals will be suggested.
This three-year postdoctoral research project, conducted by Pablo Iglesias Rodriguez, started in 2009 and is funded by the Montesquieu Institute.
For more information, visit the website of the Montesquieu Institute Maastricht
