Submenu:
Since January 2008 the Montesquieu Institute (MI) is assisting a comparative research on the parlementary control of the independent departmental agencies. The research is primarily carried out by the University of Maastricht.
The number of independent departmental agencies is rapidly increasing within the EU member states as well as within the European Union itself. These agencies are active in a number of different fields, one of which being the public arena, and the work of these agencies is often highly dependant on their independence.
In some European countries the lack of accountability is a problem for the departmental agencies. In a number of European parlementary democracies the influence of the parlement in controlling the agencies is limited to a check through the ministerial responsibilities, which are often limited themselves. How do the democratic checks on these independent agencies actually work? And how can the parlements realise democratic controls? This research will deal with these kinds of questions.
In order to answer these a number of case studies will be carried out, that is the Netherlands, Sweden, the United State and the European Union. Conclusions will be drawn based on a comparative analysis of the different case studies.
For more information send an e-mail to: info@montesquieu-instituut.nl
